Epiphenomenon@Trove

Experimental Report (Revised — CAMS5 Ensemble)

17 May 2026

Data: Trove Newspaper Archive (NLA); CAMS5 ensemble means 1875–2026 (five-scorer); aus_annual.csv (τ/ε/praet_gap); Hansard House of Representatives 2006–2025

Primary: 1900–1955 (Trove) · Contemporary: 2006–2025 (Hansard)

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1. Operational Definition

Throughout this report we distinguish between:

- **Threat-coded China discourse** (the measurable object): frequency of language that frames China or Chinese actors as a source of threat, interference, aggression, or invasion.
- **Sinophobia** (the interpretive category): threat-coded China discourse that additionally carries dehumanising, racialised, or exclusionary framing.

This distinction matters because not all threat language is equivalent, and because the same underlying CAMS conditions can produce different registers of discourse.

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2. The Falsifiable Hypothesis

From the mapping document:

> *Australian threat-coded China discourse frequency in the national record is better explained by internal Australian CAMS metrics (τ, ε, praet_gap, Bond Strength) than by independent measures of Chinese state behaviour — except in the 1900s–1910s, where the discourse operates as prosperity-mode ideology rather than stress-projection.*

This report constitutes the first systematic empirical test of that claim.

3. Summary of Findings

The experiment reveals that Australian foreign-threat discourse appears in **three distinct systemic modes**, not one:

Regime	CAMS Conditions	Mechanism	Temporal Signature	Examples
Prosperity Ideology	High τ, low ε, high BS	Confident expression of foundational exclusions from strength	Positive correlation with τ; little or no leading lag	White Australia 1900–1913; Menzies-era Russophobia
Stress Projection	Falling τ, rising ε, declining BS, rising praet_gap	Displacement of internal anxiety onto external Other	CAMS metrics lead discourse by 1–3 years (negative correlation)	Hansard Sinophobia 2017–2021
Event Response	Mixed / exogenous shock dominant	Real external events generate discourse spikes	Contemporaneous peak, rapid decay	2022 Ukraine Russophobia; 1948–51 Cold War spikes

This three-regime typology is supported by volume correlations, lead/lag structure, pre-event z-scores, Granger-style leading information tests, state-level robustness, monthly resolution, and qualitative framing analysis.

4. Part I: Trove 1900–1955 — The Prosperity Paradox

4.1 Main Result (Revised)

Threat-coded China discourse correlates **positively** with τ (r=+0.532, p<0.001) and **negatively** with ε (r=−0.553, p<0.001) across 1900–1955 — the **opposite** of the stress-projection prediction.

Interpretation: In high-coherence, low-stress periods the Australian political-cultural system expressed its foundational exclusionary ideology (White Australia) with greater volume and confidence. When the system is stressed, immediate material and survival concerns crowd out elaborate ideological threat construction. This is the **prosperity-ideology regime**.



Figure 1. Annual threat-coded China and Russia discourse ppm 1900–1955 with τ overlay. Prosperity-ideology peaks 1900–1913 and post-war 1948–1955; troughs during WWI, Depression, WWII.



Figure 2. Threat-coded China discourse ppm vs τ by historical period. Positive gradient: higher coherence → more Sinophobic discourse.



Figure 3. Lag-correlation heatmap: Spearman r between CAMS metrics and discourse frequencies at lags −2 to +3 years.



Figure 4. Threat-coded discourse ppm vs ε. Negative gradient: lower entropy → elevated China threat discourse.

4.1 Cont. — Lexicon Robustness and Specificity

Extended Sinophobia (+8 historical variants): r=+0.526 vs original +0.533. The prosperity-ideology finding is not an artefact of phrase selection.

Placebo (positive China discourse): Correlates with τ in the same direction (r=+0.398, p=0.003) — the driver is Chinese *salience*, not valence alone.

Japanese threat comparator (key specificity): Uncorrelated with CAMS overall (r=−0.088, n.s.). Post-1931 Japan discourse r=−0.555 (p=0.006), driven by actual Japanese military events. Chow break at 1931: F=16.5, p<0.0001. **Sinophobia and Japanese threat discourse have structurally different CAMS signatures**.

Pre-whitening (AR1): CAMS correlations collapse to n.s. — the relationship is *regime-level*, not year-to-year.



Figure 11. Four discourse series vs τ overlay. Sinophobia variants track closely; Japanese threat is structurally distinct.



Figure 12. Scatter plots: all discourse variants vs τ (top) and ε (bottom). Sinophobia shows positive τ gradient; Japanese threat shows near-zero or reversed gradient — confirming specificity.

4.2 Robustness: State-Level Splits

The positive correlation between threat-coded China discourse and τ holds in **every state** (r: +0.439 Tasmania to +0.517 NSW, all p<0.001). The prosperity-ideology pattern is a national structural phenomenon.

State	r (sino ppm ~ τ)	p
New South Wales	+0.517	<0.001 ***
Victoria	+0.515	<0.001 ***
South Australia	+0.486	<0.001 ***
Queensland	+0.463	<0.001 ***
Tasmania	+0.439	<0.01 **
Western Australia	+0.437	<0.01 **



Figure 13. Threat-coded China discourse ppm by state 1900–1954 with τ overlay. All six states show the prosperity-ideology pattern.



Figure 14. Spearman r(sino_ppm ~ τ) by state and decade. Uniformly positive across states in most decades.

4.3 Monthly Resolution

Monthly series confirm the annual signal at higher granularity (660 observations via `facet=month`). Lag correlations remain positive and significant ($p<0.001$) across 0–36 months. January and September peaks (~141 ppm) vs April trough (~100 ppm), consistent with parliamentary calendar.



Figure 15. Monthly threat-coded China discourse ppm 1900–1954 with rolling mean and τ overlay (upper). Seasonal bar chart by calendar month (lower).



Figure 16. Quarterly cross-correlogram: τ and BS vs discourse ppm. Positive values at short lags (0–2Q) confirm near-contemporaneous relationship.

4.4 Full-Text Framing Analysis

Coded sample (n=20 articles/year) from peak-τ years (1905, 1912, 1950) and trough years (1917, 1933, 1943) via `include=articleText`:

Framing dimension	Peak-τ years	Trough years	Difference	p-value
Dehumanising language	71.7%	45.0%	+26.7 pp	**0.003**
Domestic policy linkage	51.7%	38.3%	+13.4 pp	0.14 n.s.
Counter-discourse present	45%	43%	n.s.	0.86

1950 transitional case: Despite highest τ, 1950 shows only 25% dehumanising language — post-WWII normative shifts transformed the *register* while the CAMS-predicted elevated volume persisted via Cold War anti-communism.



Figure 17. Framing dimensions by year. Green = peak-τ; red = trough. Dehumanising language markedly higher in prosperity periods.



Figure 18. Radar chart: framing profile peak-τ (green) vs trough (red). Prosperity years show broader, more elaborate ideological framing.

5. Part II: Hansard 2006–2025 — Stress Projection Confirmed

5.1 Main Result

Threat-coded China discourse in Hansard rose from a 2006–2016 baseline of ~0.57 ppm to a 2017–2021 mean of **21.09 ppm** (37-fold increase) as τ fell from ~1.05 to 0.88 and Bond Strength declined.

OLS regression (sino_ppm ~ τ + praet_gap): R^2=0.493 (p=0.003). τ coef=−73.8, p=0.001. The direction is the **inverse** of the Trove prosperity-ideology result.



Figure 5. Hansard 2006–2025: threat-coded China and Russia discourse ppm vs τ overlay. AUKUS (2021) marks Sinophobia peak; Ukraine invasion (2022) marks Russophobia spike.



Figure 6. Sinophobia ppm vs τ (left) and praet_gap (right) by period: blue=baseline, red=escalation, orange=Ukraine shift.

5.2 Leading Information

τ and Bond Strength carry **leading information** about subsequent discourse:

- τ → sino_ppm: strongest at lag +2 to +3 years (r≈−0.74 to −0.76)
- Bond Strength → sino_ppm: strongest at lag +3 years (r=−0.814, p=0.0001)



Figure 7. Lag-correlation heatmap: CAMS metrics → Hansard discourse. τ and BS lead Sinophobia at lags +1 to +3 (deep blue).

5.3 Limitations Note (Sample Size)

The contemporary parliamentary result rests on ≈20 annual observations. While regression, lag structure, and directional consistency are striking, this section should be read as **highly suggestive structural evidence** rather than definitive proof. Replication on a larger corpus (full Senate + post-1955 newspaper sources) remains necessary.

6. Part III: Event-Study and Leading Information (1895–2026)

Formal tests on the full 125-year CAMS series against a curated database of 30 major Australian political events: τ Granger-causes composite event series (p=0.007 at lag 2); τ Granger-causes leadership instability (p=0.049 at lag 2). **CAMS structural metrics provide statistically significant information about future political crises beyond what the political record itself contains.**

- **Leadership crises**: preceded by most degraded CAMS environment (elevated ε and praet_gap, z=+0.63).
- **Security/war events**: occur under relatively high τ and Bond Strength — prosperity-mode mobilisation.
- **Economic crises**: behave as exogenous inputs that subsequently degrade CAMS metrics.



Figure 8. CAMS phase portrait τ vs ε trajectory 1895–2026. Leadership crises (blue) cluster in low-τ/high-ε quadrant; Security/War events (red) in high-τ/lower-ε zone.



Figure 9. Event-study: mean CAMS metrics in 5-year pre-event window with 95% bootstrap CIs. Leadership crises show praet_gap z=+0.63 — the sharpest pre-event signal.



Figure 10. Annual trajectory of τ, ε, and praet_gap 1895–2026 with political event rug. Phase boundaries marked: τ=1.4 (Phase 1→2), τ=1.0 (Phase 3 onset).

7. The Three-Regime Model (Final)

The combined evidence supports the following typology:

Regime	Preceding CAMS Signature	Discourse / Event Character	Key Evidence
Prosperity Ideology	High τ, high BS, low ε	Confident, often dehumanising, domestically linked exclusion	Trove volume + framing; state uniformity; 1950 transitional case
Stress Projection	Falling τ, rising ε, declining BS	Elevated threat-coded discourse; leadership churn	Hansard lags; praet_gap elevation pre-2010s; event-study z-scores
Event Response	Weak or mixed	Sharp, contemporaneous spikes from external shocks	2022 Ukraine Russophobia; many economic crises

This typology distinguishes when foreign-threat discourse is generated from system confidence, from internal deterioration, or from real external events.

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8. Limitations and Next Steps

Current limitations

- Trove coverage thins dramatically after ~1955.
- Hansard analysis uses only the Representatives chamber (n≈20 years).
- Measurement captures explicit threat language; coded and institutionalised forms are under-observed.

Highest-value next step

A formal **horse-race regression** comparing lagged CAMS metrics against independent external variables:

1. PRC policy actions and military incidents
2. US alliance pressure signals
3. Australian trade exposure to China
4. Domestic political variables (elections, government composition, security announcements)

If CAMS coefficients remain significant after these controls, the claim that Australian institutional health carries **leading information about threat-coded discourse** becomes substantially harder to dismiss.

Part V — Hands Node Epiphenomena: Working-Class Grievance Discourse

9. The Hands Node and Working-Class Grievance Discourse

The Hands node tracks the health of the labour/working-class stratum: union legitimacy, real wages, grassroots economic participation, and the material position of wage earners. CAMS5 ensemble means 1875–2026: long-run mean Node Value 7.51 (range −4.5 to 11.9). Two historical stress periods: 1929–33 (Hands NV reaching −4.5 in 1931, stress score 9.8) and 2019–21 (Hands NV=3.0–6.0, 2020s decade mean 6.6). The hypothesis is whether Hands degradation leads working-class grievance discourse, just as τ/BS degradation leads Sinophobic discourse.

9.1 Grievance Lexicon

Historical (Trove 1900–1955): *"susso", "sustenance relief", "bread line", "dole queue", "relief work", "battler/s", "working man/men", "working class", "labouring class", "class struggle", "class war", "big end of town", "unemployed", "mass unemployment", "out of work", "wage cut/s", "wage reduction", "real wages"*

Contemporary (Hansard 2006–2025): *"cost of living", "battler/s", "working families", "big end of town", "real wages", "wage stagnation", "wages growth", "housing affordability", "gig economy", "casualisation", "working poor", "robodebt", "living wage", "wage theft", "underemployment", "precarious work"*

9.2 Trove Arm Results (1900–1955)

τ is the primary driver of grievance discourse in the historical record (r=−0.687, p<0.0001). Hands alone is non-significant (r=−0.212, p=0.117) due to a **WWII confound**: 1942–44 shows peak grievance discourse (60,000+ ppm) despite high Hands (13–15), as wartime labour mobilisation, manpower disputes, and union activity inflate grievance search terms regardless of Hands node health.

The Depression pattern remains clear: low-Hands NV years (NV < 2) have significantly higher grievance discourse than high-Hands years (NV ≥ 10): 43,018 vs 35,643 ppm (Mann-Whitney p=0.039). The 1931 floor (Hands NV=−4.5, stress=9.8) corresponds to the peak grievance year (59,693 ppm): "susso" queues, the Lang split, the New Guard movement.

9.3 Hansard Arm Results (2006–2025) — The 2-Year Lead Confirmed

Key result: Hands[t] predicts grievance discourse[t+2] at r=−0.753 (p=0.0003) — the strongest single predictor in the experimental dataset.

- Lag 0 (contemporaneous): r=−0.421, p=0.065 n.s.
- Lag +1: r=−0.469, p=0.043 *
- Lag +2: r=−0.753, p=0.0003 *** ← Peak lead
- Lag +3: r=−0.625, p=0.007 **

- Lag +4: r=−0.655, p=0.006 **

The temporal sequence: Hands NV=3.0 (2020) → grievance=527 ppm (2022); Hands NV=5.0 (2021) → grievance=712 ppm (2023); peak=822 ppm (2024). The 2020–21 Hands floor directly predicts the 2022–24 cost-of-living crisis as a parliamentary discourse phenomenon, with a 2-year structural lead.

9.4 Comparison Summary

Period	Hands floor	Grievance peak	Lead	Primary register
Depression 1929–33 (Trove)	−4.5 (1931)	59,693 ppm (1931)	~0–1 yr	"susso", unemployment, class war, Lang split, New Guard
2020s 2019–21 (Hansard)	3.0 (2020)	822 ppm (2024)	**2 years**	"cost of living", housing affordability, real wages, gig economy, robodebt

Note: ppm scales differ (Trove: unique articles; Hansard: word occurrences) — ratios within each corpus are what matter.

9.5 Theoretical Extension

The Hands result adds a domestic **class-grievance dimension** to the three-regime model. When Hands degrades alongside low τ and declining BS, the system produces **two parallel epiphenomena**:

5. **Foreign-threat discourse escalation** (Sinophobia as stress projection — Part II)
6. **Domestic class-grievance discourse escalation** ("cost of living", "battler", precarity — Part V)

These are co-produced by the same underlying CAMS state. The 2017–21 period shows both simultaneously: Sinophobia rising from <1 to 35 ppm, grievance rising from ~90 to ~225 ppm. The 2022–25 period shows a shift: Sinophobia plateaus as Albanese-era China engagement commences, while grievance surges to 822 ppm as cost-of-living dominates. The *register* of stress projection varies by node-level degradation profile: praet_gap elevation → leadership instability; Hands floor → class grievance; combined → Sinophobia.

Figures H1–H4: Hands Node Analysis



Figure H1. Working-class grievance discourse ppm (orange) vs Hands Node Value (blue dashed). Top: Trove 1900–1955. Bottom: Hansard 2006–2025. The 2022–2025 cost-of-living surge is the contemporary structural analogue of the 1930s Depression pattern.



Figure H2. Lag-correlation bar charts: Spearman r between Hands Node Value and grievance discourse at lags −2 to +4. Left: Trove (WWII confound suppresses signal). Right: Hansard — Hands leads discourse by 2 years (r=−0.753, p=0.0003). Dashed lines = p=0.05 threshold.



Figure H3. Scatter plots: Hands Node Value at time t vs working-class grievance discourse 2 years later. Left: Trove (WWII cluster is the confound). Right: Hansard — strong negative gradient; 2020–21 Hands floor predicts 2022–23 discourse surge. Coloured by historical period.



−4.5 (1931)

9.6 Horse-Race Regression and Robustness Checks

Two robustness checks were run on the Hansard arm: (1) a **within-corpus z-score comparison** of the 1931 Depression and 2024 cost-of-living peaks; and (2) a **horse-race multivariate regression** pitting Hands[t−2] against lagged τ, BS, and praet_gap as predictors of grievance discourse.

Z-Score Comparison: 1931 vs 2024

Standardising each corpus against its own mean and SD allows direct comparison across the two arms despite different absolute ppm ranges:

Metric	Depression 1931 (Trove)	Cost-of-Living 2024 (Hansard)
Hands Node z-score	−2.99 (floor: Hands NV=−4.5)	−1.28 (floor: Hands=5.5)
Grievance discourse z-score	+2.37 (59,693 ppm)	+2.54 (822 ppm)

The 2024 cost-of-living discourse **exceeds** the 1931 Depression in standardised units (+2.54 vs +2.37), despite a less extreme Hands floor (z=−1.28 vs −2.99). This suggests contemporary parliamentary grievance discourse is structurally dominant relative to its modern baseline — the 2020s Hands floor, though shallower in absolute terms, produces a proportionally larger discourse response in the Hansard corpus.

Robodebt Sensitivity Check

To test whether the 2022–2024 grievance surge is an artefact of a single scandal, the lexicon was re-run with "robodebt" removed. Results: 2022 = 497 ppm, 2023 = 613 ppm, 2024 = 782 ppm (vs 527/712/822 ppm with robodebt included). Robodebt contributes **5–12% of the total surge**, leaving a 2–3× increase from the 2021 baseline (~225 ppm) intact across all three years. The surge is lexically robust, driven by cost-of-living, housing affordability, real wages, gig economy, and precarity vocabulary rather than a single policy scandal.

Horse-Race Regression: Hands vs τ/BS (n=17, 2009–2025)

A multivariate OLS regression was run for each discourse channel using lagged predictors (Hands[t−2], τ[t−2], BS[t−2], praet_gap[t−2]).

Channel	Predictor Set	R^2	F-stat	p-value	Key Coefficients
Channel 1 (Sinophobia)	Full model: Hands_L2 + τ_L2 + BS_L2 + praet_gap_L2	0.151	0.71	0.715 (n.s.)	All n.s. — multicollinearity + n≈17
Channel 2 (Grievance)	Full model: Hands_L2 + τ_L2 + BS_L2 + praet_gap_L2	0.765	9.74	0.001***	τ_L2: p=0.035*; BS_L2: p=0.032*; Hands_L2: p=0.621 (n.s.)
Channel 2 (Grievance)	Hands only: Hands_L2	0.639	—	0.0001***	Hands_L2 coef=−74.13, p=0.0001

The critical finding is that **Hands_L2 loses independent significance in the multivariate model** (p=0.621) despite carrying strong univariate predictive power (r=−0.753, p=0.0003). The explanation is structural co-linearity: Hands, τ, and BS degrade together as expressions of the same CAMS system deterioration. In the multivariate context, τ_L2 and BS_L2 absorb all incremental variance beyond what Hands already predicts. Hands has no independent incremental explanatory power — not because it is causally irrelevant, but because it is a co-produced symptom of the same underlying state.

This co-linearity has a clean theoretical interpretation: the CAMS model is *intended* to measure a coherent system state, not independent causal channels. The Hands degradation, τ decline, and BS fall of 2019–21 are the same structural event observed at different analytical resolutions. The two-channel model (Sinophobia via praet_gap/τ; grievance via Hands/τ) is therefore better understood as a **register differentiation** within a unified stress-projection mechanism, not as two causally independent pathways.



Figure H5. Five-panel summary. Top-left: z-score time series comparison (1931 Depression vs 2024 cost-of-living, standardised). Top-right: robodebt sensitivity — grievance surge with and without robodebt term. Middle: R² bar chart for Channel 2 (grievance) models, showing Hands-only (0.639) and full model (0.765). Bottom: conceptual two-channel model diagram showing Hands/τ/BS degradation producing parallel Sinophobia and grievance discourse epiphenomena.

9.7 Positive Labour Lexicon: The Asymmetry Finding

The symmetric test — does confident-labour discourse *rise* in high-Hands periods, mirroring the prosperity-ideology result for Sinophobia in Part I? — returns a **null result**. Spearman r(Hands, composite_ppm) = +0.001, p = 0.99. The null is not a failure; it is the finding.

Lexicon and Method

Three single-phrase queries were run across Trove 1900–1955 (n=56 years) and normalised against the "the" baseline: *"living wage"* (peak 2,546 ppm, 1919), *"eight hour day"* (peak 2,293 ppm, 1911), and *"full employment"* (peak 2,486 ppm, 1945). The composite sums the three counts before dividing by baseline.

Key Finding: Vocabulary of Struggle, Not Achievement

Each component peaks not at the mature high-Hands plateau but during the active transition phase — the moment of articulation, demand, and institutionalisation:

Component	Peak Year	Peak ppm	Hands at Peak	Context
"eight hour day"	1911	2,293	11.5	Federation-era campaigns; 8-hr day still being legislated state by state
"living wage"	1919	2,546	6.0	Post-WWI labour militancy; living wage as active political demand
"full employment"	1945	2,486	10.5	White Paper on Full Employment; Keynesian policy commitment

The 1950s — the highest Hands decade in the ensemble record (decade mean 11.9) and the period of maximum system coherence — show the lowest positive composite (1,284 ppm). By then "eight hour day" was statutory law, "living wage" was embedded in the arbitration award floor, and "full employment" was accepted policy. Institutionalised victories do not require articulation. The discourse evaporates precisely when the goal is achieved.

The Asymmetry

This creates a fundamental **asymmetry between grievance and positive labour discourse**:

Discourse Type	Response to Hands	Mechanism
Grievance ("susso", "battler", "cost of living")	Monotonically RISES as Hands falls	Stress-response: demands for what is lost
Positive ("living wage", "eight hour day", "full employment")	Non-monotonic: peaks during transition/struggle — NOT at the mature high-Hands peak	Mobilisation discourse: only needed when goal is contested

This asymmetry is theoretically significant. Grievance discourse functions as a **stress-response signal** — it rises and falls with system condition in near-real-time (with a 2-year structural lag). Positive labour discourse functions as a **mobilisation signal** — it peaks during the active struggle-toward-the-goal phase and then recedes once the goal is secure. The Depression (1930s) suppresses *both* registers: grievance replaces positive aspiration entirely, while the confident vocabulary of labour achievement falls to its historical minimum (1,403 ppm, decade mean).

This mirrors the China discourse finding in Part I: in the prosperity-ideology regime, threat-coded China discourse was articulated *from a position of strength*, not anxiety. Similarly, "living wage" and "eight hour day" were articulated most loudly when they were contested goals — not when they were secure achievements. The *register* of political discourse reflects the *action required by the system state*, not simply the valence of that state.

Figure H6: Positive vs Negative Labour Discourse and the Asymmetry Finding
Trove 1900–1955



Figure H6. Three-panel asymmetry analysis (Trove 1900–1955). Top: stacked positive-labour discourse components (living wage, eight hour day, full employment) with Hands overlay — each peaks during active struggle, not at mature high-Hands plateau. Middle: positive composite vs grievance discourse (÷10 for scale) — asymmetric response profiles. Bottom: scatter of Hands vs positive composite, colour-coded by period — null correlation (r=+0.001), with peak discourse clustering in mid-Hands transition zones, not at high-Hands maturity.

9.8 Policy Implications

The two-channel model carries a direct structural implication for political forecasting. The ensemble CAMS5 data shows the 2020s Hands decade mean at 6.6 (1930s mean: 2.0), with the 2020 floor at NV=3.0 — the lowest since the 1990–92 recession. Any administration facing a Hands floor of this depth should anticipate a 2–3 year dominance of cost-of-living and class-grievance discourse in the parliamentary and media register, regardless of foreign policy posture.

The τ/BS deterioration that drives Sinophobic stress-projection and the Hands degradation that drives grievance are *co-produced* by the same system state. A government that responds to the

Hands floor primarily through foreign-threat signalling (intensifying the Sinophobia register) is addressing the praet_gap/τ channel while leaving the Hands/grievance channel unattended. The discourse data suggest this substitution is structurally ineffective: the 2017–2021 period shows *both* registers rising simultaneously, and the 2022–2025 shift to Albanese-era China engagement reduced the Sinophobia register while the grievance register continued its structural surge.

The structural recovery prescription is grounded in the ensemble metrics: as Hands NV rises above 8–9 (approaching the Menzies-era 11.9 plateau), the grievance register should fall toward the 2006–2016 baseline (~77–90 ppm). The ensemble already shows Hands NV at 8.5 in 2025–26, now marginally exceeding Stewards (7.5) — the first time since 1947–48. The appearance of "real wage gains", "wages growth", and "housing affordability improving" in parliamentary speech would confirm Hands recovery; the discourse asymmetry would then run in reverse, with aspirational vocabulary re-emerging as gains are actively contested rather than institutionally settled.

Structural forecast: The ensemble shows Hands NV already recovering — from 3.0 (2020) to 8.5 (2025–26), now marginally exceeding the Stewards node (7.5) for the first time since the late 1940s. On the two-year lead-time model, sustained Hands recovery through 2023–25 should produce a measurable easing of grievance discourse by 2027–28. If Hands deteriorates again under renewed housing, wages, or employment pressures, the grievance surge will persist. The CAMS framework predicts the discourse, not the politics; but the discourse is now measurable in real time via Hansard and Trove.

9.9 Stewards vs Hands: The Two-Register Model

The Hands node tracks working-class/labour health (wages, job security, union legitimacy). The **Stewards node** tracks asset-owner and capital-side health (property values, business viability, investment confidence, small-business sustainability). When these two nodes diverge, they generate **different political registers** — not simply more or less grievance, but grievance of a qualitatively different kind directed at different systemic targets.

Data and Method

Three Stewards-stress lexicon terms were tested in Trove newspapers 1900–1955: *"foreclosure"* (property distress — clearest Stewards-stress indicator), *"business failures"*, and *"insolvency"*. For the contemporary arm (2006–2016), three Stewards-register terms were tested in Trove: *"negative gearing"*, *"property investor"*, and *"red tape"*. Trove coverage collapses after 2016 (baseline drops from 27,000 to ~2,500 articles/year) — the contemporary arm uses Hansard grievance ppm for the Hands register beyond 2016.

Historical Results (Trove 1900–1955)

Foreclosure as Stewards-stress indicator: Spearman r(Stewards, foreclosure_ppm) = −0.262, p=0.051 — right direction, marginal significance. Critically, r(Hands, foreclosure_ppm) = −0.014, p=0.92 — null. Foreclosure tracks Stewards deterioration specifically, not general system stress.

Period	Hands	Stewar	Divergence	Foreclosur	Grievance ppm	Register

		ds	(S−H)	e ppm		
1916–17 (WWI)	4.0–6.0	7.5–9.5	+2 to +5	40–45	48,000–49,000	Hands only
1930–31 (Depression)	−4.5 to −3.5	−4.1 to −1.1	−0.4 to −2.4	197–321	49,000–59,000	BOTH fire
1933–35 (recovery)	5.0–10.5	7.0–12.5	+1 to +4	215–352	39,000–45,000	Both declining
1950–55 (Menzies boom)	11.9	12.5	−0.6	4–27	21,000–27,000	Neither dominant

The WWI period (1916–17) is particularly instructive: the ensemble shows Hands NV at 4.0–6.0 (moderate — labour direction and conscription suppressing wages) while Stewards held at 7.5–9.5 (property and business still viable). Grievance discourse surged (48,000–49,000 ppm) while foreclosure remained low (39–57 ppm). One-sided Hands stress fires only the Hands register. The Depression (1930–31) floored both nodes simultaneously (Hands −4.5, Stewards −4.1 in 1931) — both registers fired at maximum intensity together.

Contemporary Results (2006–2025)

The GFC (2008–09) briefly activated both channels: the ensemble shows Stewards dropping from ~10–11 (2006–07) to ~8–9 (2009–10) and negative gearing/property investor discourse surging (841–2,221 ppm), while Hansard grievance rose (399 ppm in 2008). The 2010–2016 period shows an important asymmetry: Stewards recovered modestly (7.5–8.0) but negative gearing discourse remained high (2,177–4,563 ppm). This is the contest phase — Labor challenging negative gearing policy generated Stewards-register discourse not because property investors were distressed but because their policy protections were under political threat. The pattern mirrors the positive labour lexicon finding: the vocabulary of defence peaks during contestation, not at peak security.

Period	Hands	Stewards	Stewards register (Trove neg gearing)	Hansard grievance	Dominant register
2006–07 (Howard peak)	5.5–7.5	~10–11	876–928 ppm	78–193 ppm	Neither (prosperity)
2008–09 (GFC)	9.9	8.0–9.0	841–2,221 ppm	62–399 ppm	Both briefly
2010–16 (contest era)	7.0–9.9	7.5–8.0	2,177–4,563 ppm	87–185 ppm	Stewards (contest)
2020–25 (current)	3.0–8.5	7.5	Trove unavailable	527–822 ppm	Hands only

The 2020–25 period represents the clearest case of one-sided Hands stress in the post-WWII record. The ensemble CAMS5 data shows Hands decade mean 6.6 (2020s) against a Stewards node that held at 7.5 throughout 2015–26 — moderately stressed but not floored. The gap peaked in 2020 (Hands NV=3.0, Stewards NV=7.5, divergence=−4.5 — the largest since 1982). By 2025–26 Hands has recovered to 8.5, now exceeding Stewards for the first time since 1947–48. Working people faced cost-of-living, housing affordability, real wages, and gig-economy pressures across this period; asset owners saw property prices sustained and superannuation recovering. The discourse consequence is precisely what the model predicts: class-grievance language at near-record levels (822 ppm, 2024) while Stewards-register discourse is structurally absent from the contemporary political agenda.

The Quadrant Model

Across the full 1895–2026 CAMS series, four distinct regime-states are visible in the Hands×Stewards phase space:

Quadrant	Hands	Stewards	Political Register	Australian Examples
Both strong	≥10	≥10	Low discourse pressure; prosperity politics	1950s (Menzies); 2003–07 (Howard boom)
Both weak (crisis)	<3	<3	BOTH registers fire simultaneously; maximum instability	1930–31 (Depression); 1890–93 (banking crisis)
Hands weak only	<5	≥5	Class-grievance register dominates; Stewards discourse suppressed	1916–19 (WWI); 2019–25 (current)
Stewards weak only	≥5	<5	Asset-owner/small-business register dominates; labour quiet	Rare; elements in 1907–08

Figure H7: Stewards vs Hands — The Two-Register Model
Australia 1900–1955 (Trove) and 2006–2025 (Trove + Hansard)



Figure H7. Three-panel Stewards vs Hands analysis. Top: Historical 1900–1955 — foreclosure ppm (Stewards-stress, ×30 scaled, blue) vs grievance ppm (Hands-stress, ÷100, red) with Hands and Stewards node overlays. The 1931 Depression fires both; WWI fires only Hands. Middle: Contemporary 2006–2025 — Stewards register (negative gearing + property investor, ÷100, bars) vs Hansard grievance ppm (red line); Trove coverage ends 2016. GFC briefly activates both; 2010–2016 contest-phase Stewards discourse; 2020–2025 one-sided Hands dominance. Bottom: CAMS quadrant map 1895–2025 — Stewards vs Hands node values coloured by dominant register. 2020–2024 cluster (orange) is the "Hands only" zone, historically unusual since the WWI period.

End of Report